PREFACE

Robert M. O'Neil*

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS has once again made a

major and timely contribution to our understanding of complex legal and policy issues that affect
the world of mass communications. Consistently
through the past decade, COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
has identified and analyzed the emerging topics
in this field, thus providing an invaluable resource
for scholars, practitioners and students. It is a singular honor and privilege, from the perspective of
an appreciative reader, to have the opportunity to
introduce this issue. This is an especially rich collection of essays on important and pertinent issues.
As the legal focus has shifted rapidly toward Internet legal questions, it is especially fitting that
two major articles in this issue address different

facets of digital law and policy. In one of the lead
articles, Christopher Boam poses a basic issue of
Internet law-making-the degree to which content posted or disseminated in digital form can
and should be the target of government regulation. Understandably, most of our concern in this
area has been with such elusive matters as "indecency," "harmful to minors" and "virtual child
pornography," to name the three issues of content regulation that are currently before the U.S.
Supreme Court. One of the two very thoughtful
student comments focuses helpfully on the virtual
child pornography issue, which the high Court
has just agreed to review early in its 2001 term.
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But Mr. Boam wisely reminds us that there is
much more to regulation than these highly visible
and politically volatile areas of legislative concern-and that we need to understand the technology of the process far better than most regulators seem to have understood it to date.
The other lead article, by James Assey and
Demetrious Eleftheriou, picks up a theme on
which Boam touches-the privacy directive of the
European Union-and gives it central emphasis
in a most timely and helpful manner. The EU
Draft Directive has indeed posed a dilemma for a
substantial part of the digital community in this
country. It also has aroused deep concern among
media groups and others who seek to keep open
the widest channels of access to information, because U.S. compliance would potentially deprive
U.S. mass media and other information-seekers of
a substantial domestic resource, not to mention
the international implications for a world increasingly linked through instantaneous global communications.
The piece de resistance of this issue of the
COMMlAW CONSPECTUS is a remarkable interview

with Larry Flynt, which might justifiably be subtitled "pre-eminent pornographer tells all." The interview, conducted by Clay Calvert and Robert
Richards, has very special meaning for me. The
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eral years ago brought Mr. Flynt and his adversary, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, together with
their respective attorneys at a conference designed to revisit the Supreme Court case of Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.

Though we did not appreciate its uniqueness at
the time, this gathering marked the one and only
occasion on which these titanic clients and their
lawyers have publicly discussed the case. Flynt and
Falwell themselves, as the interview notes, have
long since buried the hatchet, and periodically
get together for private sessions.
What is so valuable about the interview is that it
faithfully captures the fascinatingly complex maverick that is Larry Flynt. At one point during our
conference, he was asked whether he would continue to push the envelope of sexually explicit
content even if the readership of Hustler were to
decline sharply. Those of us who view him as a
champion of First Amendment values confidently
expected an affirmative answer. Instead, what we
got was a long and reflective pause, followed by an
almost offhand, "Well, I'm a businessman."
The gist of his reply, yielding a rare insight into
the real Larry Flynt, was that if not enough people
wanted to read salacious material, there might be
publishers who would continue to assault social
mores and tastes, but they probably would not include Larry Flynt. This was a low moment for
those who tend to excuse many of Mr. Flynt's
aberrations (such as being the 20th century's only
litigant to disrupt proceedings of the Supreme
Court) on the ground that he has, after all, been
an indefatigable fighter for free expression.
What this interview reveals is the exceptional
complexity of the real Larry Flynt. There is ample
evidence of a willingness-indeed a relish-to test
government restraints on seemingly principled
grounds, such as Flynt's suit against the nearly total blackout imposed on media coverage of the
1983 invasion of Grenada.
Yet, even in such seemingly pure initiatives, as
with the full-page ads during the Clinton impeachment trauma which forced the resignation
of a speaker of the House, principle cannot be
separated completely from such baser values as
political partisanship. And just as we think we
know what motivates this curious man, we are reminded that the impeachment ad campaign may
have been designed more to expose perceived hypocrisy on the part of the president's accusers
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than to convey support and sympathy for Bill Clinton.
One of the most appealing features of this interview is its tripartite structure. It opens, appropriately, by revisiting the great case of Hustler v.
Falwell. Because this case was the focus of the
Thomas Jefferson Center's conference, we were
often asked by reporters whether the Court's ruling was as important to First Amendment law as
one might infer from the high level of interest
that our conference had generated. Quite candidly, we conceded there was probably more intrigue than long-term substance.
After all, Reverend Falwell had filed his suit
against Hustler and Flynt on three grounds, only
one of which even reached the Supreme Court.
The invasion-of-privacy claim was a loser from the
start, as the jury recognized and the court of appeals affirmed. The libel claim was a bit more durable, though the Fourth Circuit correctly ruled
that the content of the infamous parody of a
Campari ad could not remotely have been viewed
as defamatory.
That left only intentional inflection of emotional distress as a viable issue. If there was anything remarkable about the case, it was the ease
and confidence with which the justices equated
that cause of action with libel, at least in the case
of a public official or public figure. Two highly
unusual things happened at this point in the process-things that Mr. Flynt (assuming he would
fare no better in the high Court than he had below) could not possibly have anticipated. One was
the striking metamorphosis of "emotional distress" from a claim that ordinarily posed no First
Amendment concerns to one that now deserved
the full protection of the New York Times v. Sullivan privilege when the plaintiff was a public figure. (We tend to forget that nonpublic figure
plaintiffs have, since time immemorial, recovered
damages for cruel jokes and taunts without any attention to possible free speech concerns.)
The other innovation was even more remarkable. Applying the New York Times v. Sullivan privilege standard meant that a public figure plaintiff
could still recover but only on proof of "actual
malice"-actual knowledge that the statement was
false, or reckless disregard of the issue of veracity.
But the Court had already ruled that the offending statements in the parodied ad were not of the
sort that could give rise to a libel claim because
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they lacked the requisite factual character. Moreover, Flynt's testimony included evidence of an animus that would, anywhere else, have seemed dispositive on the issue "of actual malice." When
asked by Falwell's attorney whether he had meant
to harm the preacher's character, the publisher
volunteered, 'Yeah, to assassinate it." Yet when
the dust settled, the Court ruled that as a matter
of constitutional law, the record simply could not
sustain a finding of "actual malice."
Only one conclusion seems tenable, though no
Justice stated it: When it comes to intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlike libel or falselight privacy, a public figure simply may not recover at all, because the theoretical invitation to
overcome the privilege by proving "actual malice"
turns out to be illusory. One cannot prove "reckless disregard" of the truth if the statement falls
outside the truth-falsehood continuum. And if an
admission under oath that "I meant to assassinate
his character" is legally insufficient to establish actual malice, it is difficult to imagine any evidence
that might possibly be more probative.
If this analysis of the Hustler v. Falwell ruling is

sound, then Larry Flynt got from the Supreme
Court a measure of First Amendment protection
far broader than he needed, or sought, or even
realized at the time. Yet his perseverance through
the courts, at a time of acute physical suffering.
from his recent grave wounding by a would-be
assassin, and a time also of profound legal risk,
did establish important First Amendment principles. Once again, Calvert and Richards splendidly
capture in their interview the paradox of realism
and idealism that is Larry Flynt.
His own take on the import of his Supreme
Court triumph is hard to improve upon, even after more than a decade of analysis: "If the First
Amendment gives you any right, it gives you the
right to be offensive. Just because somebody may
have been offended by a Falwell parody doesn't
give them the right to suppress it." For establishing that principle, we owe a fair amount to Larry
Flynt. And for helping us to understand how that
principle entered the law, and where it fits in the
larger context of First Amendmentjurisprudence,
we owe much to COMMLAW CONSPECTUS for sharing with us this remarkable and timely interview.

